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Consumer Law, Class Actions, and the
Common Law
Michael S. Greve*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Even where bodies of law purport to be defined by their
subject matter, such as ìhealth care lawî or ìhousing law,î they
are often distinguished from legal arrangements covering the
same area by their underlying presumptions. ìEmployment law,î
for instance, covers substantially the same economic transactions
as the older labor law and still-older common law doctrines.
Those fields differ chiefly in their premises, and consequently,
their institutional arrangements. Unlike labor law, which is
principally the law of labor unions and their rights and relations
vis-‡-vis management (under the auspices of the National Labor
Relations Board), employment law is individualistic. With few
exceptions, the right to remain free from discrimination is the
individual employeeís, and it can be enforced outside union
channels and arbitration regimes.1 In that respect, employment
law resembles the old common law of contract and employment
at will, but with a twist. Instead of a fundamental, bilateral
freedom not to deal, employment law establishes the employeeís
unilateral right to remain free from discriminatory treatment.2
This antidiscrimination principle permits the employee to press
the employer into transactions that they would rather avoid, all
things considered.3 The purported extension of common law
rights masks their redistribution.
In a similar way, ìconsumer lawî is parasitic on, and
transformative of, common law doctrines grounded in contract
* Ph.D. (Government), Cornell University, 1987. I am indebted to Kate Rick for her
capable research assistance and to Richard Epstein, Robert Gasaway, Michael Kelly,
Jonathan Klick, George Priest, and David Rosenberg for exceptionally helpful suggestions
and comments on earlier drafts.
1 That, of course, was the point: seniority rules and other labor union practices often
worked to the disadvantage of minority employees. See, e.g., Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S.
755, 758-59 (1989).
2 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 3 (1992).
3 Id. at 5, 73.
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and tort. While unknown before the 1970s, modern ìconsumer
lawî does not govern a single transaction that is not also covered
by traditional common law doctrines. However, where tort law
required an actual injury as an essential element of a cause of
action; consumer law dispenses with that requirement and others
like it, such as inducement and detrimental reliance.4 Where the
common law matched the sellerís duty to steer clear of fraud and
misrepresentation with the contractual principle of ìbuyer
beware,î consumer law substitutes a unilateral duty of disclosure
on the seller.5
My point in highlighting these differences is not to argue for
the superiority of common law rules over consumer law
constructs. I will stipulate that mandatory disclosure rules may
be efficient in some settings. For purposes at hand, I will even
concedeóalthough I frankly doubtóthat a full-fledged consumer
law regime might, at a highly abstract and theoretical level, be
shown to be just as efficient as an equally stylized common law
regime. Rather, my point is that it makes no sense to have the
two regimes operate on top of each other and over the same range
of transactions. However, that is the system we now have. Just
as employment law was superimposed on the pre-existing regime
of contractual employment obligations, so too has consumer law
been piggybacked on top of common law doctrines governing the
promotion and sale of goods and services. This dual regime is
extremely unlikely to enhance social welfare or even consumer
interests.6
II. DEVELOPMENT OF CONSUMER LAW
Handbooks and treatises on ìconsumer lawî often define it as
a contradistinction to commercial law, meaning the law
governing transactions among merchants.7 The common law, of
4 See, e.g., The Honorable Sheldon Gardner & Robert Kuehl, Acquiring an
Historical Understanding of Duties to Disclose, Fraud, and Warranties, 104 COM L.J. 168,
186-88 (1999).
5 Id. at 178-79.
6 In commenting on an earlier draft, David Rosenberg has forcefully reminded me
that redundant, competing systems of law may be very useful for a number of reasons,
such as information discovery and a reduction of the frequency and cost of error. To that
extent, the dual system problem dissolves into a coordination problem. This is the correct
perspective. The central coordination problem to my mind is this: redundancy has
salutary effects so long as in any given case or transaction, each system operates to the
exclusion of the other. In such a case, the parties and their disputes can migrate from one
to the other and the systems check each other at the margin. However, consumer law and
common law rarely operate in this competitive sense of ìredundancy.î They operate
jointly, which is bound to compound errors. Even compound errors, one might argue,
generate information, but they are unlikely to generate useful operational information at
an acceptable cost.
7 See MICHAEL M. GREENFIELD, CONSUMER LAW: A GUIDE FOR THOSE WHO
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course, made no such distinction; it rested on a robust, acrossthe-board presumption in favor of freedom of contract.8 Even the
Uniform Commercial Code (ìUCCî) treats consumer transactions
under the same rules that apply to comparable business
transactions.9 However, consumer law theorists and advocates
insist that the assumptions that underpin freedom of contract
simply do not apply in the context of consumer transactions.
Using often-colorful language, consumer lawyers conjure up a
world of ignorant, impulsive consumers who stumble helplessly
through a world of serial monopolies.10 In soberer moments, they
identify the characteristics that supposedly distinguish consumer
markets: asymmetric information (or wholesale consumer
ignorance), unequal bargaining power, and irrational consumer
preferences.11 Consumer protection laws attempt to redress
these problems by imposing affirmative disclosure obligations12
through outright prohibitions on abusive, extortionate, or
unconscionable contract terms and sales practices,13 or through
mandatory cooling-off or revocation periods.14
All these rationalizations prove either too much or too little
to define the discrete field of ìconsumer law.î Information is
asymmetric in business as well as consumer transactions (the
seller almost always knows more than the buyer); still, for good
reasons, the general rule remains ìbuyer beware.î Bargaining
power is often unequal in the business sector, but within the
general framework of protections against fraud and monopoly, we
let the parties deal, or not deal, as they wish. Evidence of
REPRESENT SELLERS, LENDERS, AND CONSUMERS 2 (1995); FREDERICK H. MILLER ET AL.,
CONSUMER LAW: CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS 3 (1998).
8 See Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract
Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 769 n.33 (2002).
9 Even with respect to such consumer law chestnuts as unconscionability and
warranties, the UCC makes no distinction between merchants and consumers. See
U.C.C. ßß 2-302, 2-312 to 2-317 (1997 & Supp. 2003). The UCC did contain a few rare
distinctions between consumers and businesses, which have been repealed. See, e.g.,
U.C.C. ßß 9-505, 9-507 (repealed 1999).
10 Even casebooks display that tendency: in consumer transactions, ìthe position of
the parties is such that the consumer is faced with a take-it-or-leave-it proposition, and
often few alternative sources of supply offering any substantially different deal.î MILLER
ET AL., supra note 7, at 4.
11 Id. at 3-4; Lary Lawrence, Toward a More Efficient and Just Economy: An
Argument for Limited Enforcement of Consumer Promises, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 815, 817, 82425 (1987).
12 See, e.g., Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, 12 U.S.C. ß 2601 (2001)
(commonly referred to as ìRESPAî); Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. ßß 77a-77aa (1997);
Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. ß1601 (1998); Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. ß
2302 (1998); 12 C.F.R. ß 18.4 (2003).
13 See, e.g., Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. ß 1692 (1998); 16 C.F.R. ßß
310.4, 453.2-453.3 (2003); 47 C.F.R. ß 64.1200 (2002).
14 See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. ß 1635 (1998) (establishing right for
consumeróbut not lending institutionóto revoke mortgage contract within three days
without penalty); 16 C.F.R. ß 429.1 (2003).
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pervasive irrationality is far too conjectural at this point to
warrant careless paternalism; at most, it may justify circumspect
interventions that protect the irrational from costly mistakes
without, in the same process, inflicting costs on the rational.15
There is no set of criteria or principles that reliably
delineates a discrete ìconsumer law,î and, in truth, the attempt
to conjure up such a body of law partook of a broader, explicitly
ideological reform movement. Beginning in the 1960s, large
numbers of policy advocates and legal scholars argued that
common law forms and formalities were an impediment to social
reform, the effective management of public problems, and the
aspirations and interests of deserving political constituencies.16
At its zenith, this critique became distilled in an ambitious effort
to develop a full-blown theory of ìpublic law,î a term that has
since lost currency.17 The venue for the most serious and
thoroughgoing version of this argument was environmental law,
whose champions claimed that environmental complexities
rendered common law distinctions between ìmine and thineî ìa
menace to an imperiled planet.î18 In an interconnected world,
human activities become per se externalities.19 Thus, when an
endangered woodpecker decides to build its nest where you
decide to build your house, the bird wins and you lose.20
15 See Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and
the Case for ìAsymmetric Paternalism,î 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1212-14 (2003). Note
also that this rationale would often appear to dictate regulatory strategies that are
diametrically opposed to actually existingóand well-nigh sacrosanctóìconsumer
protections.î Disclosure obligations for public corporations and broker-dealers, for
example, are loudly touted as protections for the proverbial ìsmall investor.î Even if
equity markets are approximately efficient, the vast majority of those investors should not
dabble in the market; they should buy index funds. Merrill Lynch and its ilk complied
with every applicable regulation, which did nothing to prevent unsophisticated consumers
from entering a bubbly market. By taking those investors as the yardstick, disclosure
regulation creates a moral hazard (a kind of deposit insurance for stock market
amateurs), while distorting or suppressing information (such as forward-looking
information) that would be of use to more sophisticated investors. Arguably, an efficient
paternalistic regime would license stock buyers, not brokers. See Stephen J. Choi &
Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities
Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 941-43 (1998).
16 See generally, Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) (arguing
for the expansion of property rights to government entitlements).
17 See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAWíS EMPIRE (1986); Abram Chayes, The Role of
the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Owen M. Fiss, The
Supreme Court 1978 TermñForeward: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979);
Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L. J. 1539 (1988).
18 MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE DEMISE OF ENVIRONMENTALISM IN AMERICAN LAW 1
(1996).
19 See A. Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial
Unraveling of Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1125 (1994) (noting that all
human activities produce negative externalities).
20 Brian Mannix, The Origin of Endangered Species and the Descent of Man, AM.
ENTERPRISE, Nov.ñDec. 1992, at 58, 58. This paradigm continues to appear in the case
law. See, e.g., Natíl Assoc. of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1052-54 (D.C. Cir.
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Environmental lawís ambition of managing entire ecosystems in
accordance with a coherent political scheme rests on a full-scale
repudiation of the common law and its theoretical foundations,
including notions of property, harm, and individual injury.21
Consumer law advocates could rest their case, at least
initially, on a more modest critique of the common law and of a
market economy. Affirmative disclosure obligations, they argue,
would make for more informed consumers and hence better
customers.22 Such obligations would improve rather than stifle
competition.23 Unlike environmental law, consumer law remains
at least superficially tied to production values.24 Similarly,
consumer law advocates need not attack the common law at its
roots; they can plausibly rest their case on the enforcement
problems and transaction costs that attend common law
litigation. Those barriers, the argument runs, may prevent the
victims of wrongful conduct from asserting their claims when, as
is often the case in consumer transactions, those claims are
small.25 The costs of detecting and proving unlawful conductó
for example, in cases of fraud, which require proof of the
defendantís knowing and intentional misrepresentationómay
further exacerbate a tendency towards under-enforcement and
under-deterrence. That is especially so when even the full
enforcement of the available remedies, such as damages under
the out-of-pocket rule, leave a lawbreaking defendant no worse
off (net of the costs of defending the claims) than his law-abiding
competitor.26
This thoroughly familiar argument suggests equally familiar
remedies. An obvious choice is to entrust public agencies with
1997) (holding that the Federal Endangered Species Act passes constitutional muster
under the Commerce Clause due to the interconnectedness of the world).
21 Greve, supra note 18, at 6-7.
22 See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. ß 1601 (1998); Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. ß 2302 (1998).
23 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. ßß 1601, 2302.
24 The unfair competition laws that were to become a principal vehicle for the
creation of ìconsumer law,î see, e.g., MILLER ET AL., supra note 7, at 5-6, were originally
enacted to protect competitors and competition rather than consumers. The Federal
Trade Commission Act of 1915 was amended to protect consumer interests after the
Supreme Court ruled that the original statute protected competitors exclusively. See FTC
v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 653 (1931); Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. ß 41
(1914), amended by 15 U.S.C.ß 45(a)(1) (1938). Californiaís Unfair Competition Law, far
and away the most draconian consumer statute in the nation, originated as a statute to
protect competition and to this day is viewed as embodying that objective. See Robert C.
Fellmeth, Unfair Competition Act Enforcement by Agencies, Prosecutors, and Private
Litigants: Whoís on First?, 15 CAL. REG. L. REP. 1, 2-3 (1995).
25 See Fellmeth, supra note 24, at 4 (ìOne public price paid is a barrier to entry to
one who has, in fact, a product or service many would greatly desireóif they could believe
claims made about it.î).
26 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ß 549 cmt. g (1977).
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the definition and enforcement of prohibitions and injunctions
against unfair or fraudulent business practices, without having
to prove the common law elements of such violations. Another
strategy, albeit a crude one, is to increase the rewards for private
enforcers. A third strategy, running roughly concurrent with the
invention of consumer law, is the bundling of small claims in
class actions. While all three strategies predate the invention of
modern consumer law by more than a half-century,27 their use
increased enormously during the 1970s when Congress and state
legislatures enacted a rash of consumer protection statutes and
damages provisions.28 As a result, jury awards proliferated.29
Also, in the wake of the 1966 class action reforms, federal and
state courts created a novel and remarkably permissive regime
for the prosecution and adjudication of mass claims.30
That prompt accommodation to perceived consumer needs
failed to create an equilibrium where consumer law has come to
rest. It is exceedingly difficult to tailor private rewards to
deterrence objectives, and, in any event, their effectiveness still
depends on the availability of a sufficiently large plaintiff class.
Public consumer protection agencies, even when run by consumer
advocates,31 still operate under budgetary constraints and
countervailing political pressures. Modern class actions are
fraught with a wide array of problems, including substantial
transaction costs and sweetheart settlements or ìreverse
auctionsî that dilute the deterrent value of such actions.32
27 See, e.g. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. ß 15 (1914) (treble damages for antitrust
violations); Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. ß 41 (1914) (authorizing the Federal
Trade Commission to regulate unfair or deceptive acts in business commerce), amended
by 15 U.S.C. ß 45(a)(1); Martin Act of 1921, N.Y. GEN BUS. LAW ßß 352-359 (McKinney
1996 & Supp. 2003) (regulating investment security sales in New York and requiring
brokers, advisors, etc. to register with the New York Attorney Generalís office).
28 Jeff Sovern, Private Actions Under the Deceptive Trade Practices Acts:
Reconsidering the FTC Act as Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 437, 446 (1991) [hereinafter
Sovern, Reconsidering].
29 Id.
30 Apparently, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee had no such goal in mind. See
Class Action Reform Gets a Shot in the Arm, 69 DEF. C. J. 263, 264 (2002) (ìProfessor
Arthur Miller, who was involved with the work of the committee at that time, tells us that
ëNothing was in the committeeís mind . . . . And the rule was not thought of as having the
kind of application that it now has.íî).
31 During the 1970s, leaders of Ralph Naderís consumer organizations assumed
high-ranking government positions: Joan Claybrook ran the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration and Michael Pertschuk the Federal Trade Commission.
32 The latter practice has prompted intense academic debate and a broad range of
reform proposals. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling
Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000);
Bruce L. Hay & David Rosenberg, ìSweetheartî and ìBlackmailî Settlements in Class
Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377 (2000); Samuel Issacharoff,
Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 341-42
(1999).
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Besides, consumer law itself creates a kind of upward demand
spiral. Confronted with a prohibition against competition on
some margin (for example, interest rates on consumer loans or
mortgages), sellers will compete on some other, less transparent
margin, thus creating demands for additional interventions.33 If
more laws and affirmative obligations, bigger government
agencies with bigger enforcement budgets, and better incentives
for injured consumers do not do the job, the natural move is to
mimic environmental law after all: divorce lawfulness from
individual harm, legal claims from their common law owners,
and legal theories from production values. In fact, the law has
moved on this trajectory. Its chief propellant has been the
consumer class action. A simple example, based loosely on an
actual case that eventually settled for a modest $2.1 billion,
illustrates the progression. 34
III. CONSUMER LAW CLASS ACTIONS
Suppose a company sells a large number of identical
computers at a price of $1,000 with an implied or actual promise
that the product will function flawlessly. Unfortunately, it turns
out that a series of complex operations performed by only a small
number of marginal consumers causes the system to crash.
What is the sensible assignment of rights?
The common law rule, in a nutshell, is to deter negligent
misrepresentation or simple mistake by means of providing
redress for those persons, and only those persons, who have
suffered an injury and who justifiably relied on the
manufacturerís representations.35 Under the out-of-pocket rule,
redress includes restitution for the full purchase price minus the
residual value of the product, if any.36 It also includes the userís
33 The literature on banking and consumer loan regulation has amply documented
the phenomenon. See, e.g., Christopher C. DeMuth, The Case Against Credit Card Interest
Rate Regulation, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 201 (1986); Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Credit
Cards, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 79, 82-83 (2000). In the area of subprime mortgage lending,
consumer advocates are pressingóboth at the state and the federal levelófor the
regulation of opaque loan terms whose use was very likely induced by earlier rounds of
ìconsumer protectionî legislation, in particular de facto usury ceilings. See Michael S.
Greve, Subprime, but not Half-Bad: Mortgage Regulation as a Case Study in Preemption,
FEDERALIST OUTLOOK Sept.-Oct. 2003, at 1, available at http://www.aei.org/publications/
contentID.20038142219500221/default.asp.
34 Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 926 (E.D. Tex. 1999); Andy
Pasztor & Peter Landers, Toshiba to Pay $2B Settlement on Laptops, WALL ST. J. ONLINE,
Oct. 31, 1999, available at http://zdnet.com.com/2100-11-516294.html.
35 In addition, a plaintiff must show that the representation was in fact false and
made with the intent of inducing the plaintiff to rely on it. 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and
Deceit ß 26 (2001); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ß 552 (1977). Of course, pleading
and proof requirements for the historically disfavored tort of fraud are still more
demanding. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ß 526 cmt. b (1977).
36 Id. ß 552B.
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opportunity costs (the foregone benefits of purchasing a
competing, flawless product).37 It appears that most courts also
award quasi-contractual, benefit-of-the-bargain redress for the
consumerís disappointed expectations.38 Marginal consumers
who satisfy the dual requirements of detrimental reliance receive
full compensation, and the infra-marginal consumers for whom
the product worked as promised receive nothing.
The alternative is to ask what legal regime individuals
would choose ex anteóthat is, prior to the purchase or use of this
or any other product. The answer, some scholars have argued, is
a rule that creates adequate deterrence for the manufacturer to
optimally investment in precautionary measures.39 On the
additional assumption that individuals are risk-averse, the rule
will also provide full insurance coverage for all economic losses.
However, the rule will not provide compensation in excess of the
insured amounts, for example, compensation for non-pecuniary
losses.40 This is bad news for consumer-plaintiffs from an ex post,
wealth-maximizing perspective.
The good news is that from a deterrence-oriented, ex ante
perspective, common law considerations of injury, inducement,
and justifiable reliance are beside the point and quite probably
harmful. Those questions go only to the distribution of the
proceeds, which is separate from and secondary to the
determination of the correct deterrence level.41 To be sure, if
damages are set at the right level litigation by the marginal
consumers may produce a deterrence level that will generate
optimal investments in precautions. But why should we rely on
those consumers and their uncertain incentives to extract the
sellerís windfall? It may make more sense to round up the
purchasers all along the demand curve and figure out the
difference between the purchase price and the price that
consumers would have paid in the aggregate had the true
characteristics of the product been known.

See id.
In other words, courts do not attempt to restore the plaintiff to the position that
he would have occupied had the misrepresentation never been made; they attempt to put
him into the position he would have occupied, had the false communication been true. Id.
ß 549 cmt. g (criticizing the practice but acknowledging its preponderance); Michael B.
Kelly, The Phantom Reliance Interest in Tort Damages, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 169, 170-71
(2001).
39 CHARLES FRIED & DAVID ROSENBERG, MAKING TORT LAW: WHAT SHOULD BE DONE
AND WHO SHOULD DO IT 18-20 (2003).
40 See id. at 13-26 (describing this perspective in a non-technical manner).
41 See generally David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation
Functions in Mass Tort Class Actions for Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1871 (2002)
[hereinafter Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation].
37
38
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Increasing numbers of class actions, including some cases of
considerable notoriety, proceed from this premise only to push
towards a rather more insidious conclusion. A few examples
illustrate the pattern:
Williams v. Purdue Pharma Co.42 was a class action on
behalf of purchasers of OxyContin, a potent opioid.43 The
plaintiffs complained that Purdue conducted a deceptive,
misleading, and fraudulent advertising campaign that falsely
stated the product would provide ìsmooth and sustained pain
relief,î and posed little risk of addiction when used as
prescribed.44 The class plaintiffs did not claim that the product
failed to work as advertised for them or that they became
addicted.45 Instead, they argued that they were deprived of the
full benefit of their purchase bargain because the product failed
to work as advertised for some other consumers.46
In Avery v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,47
an Illinois jury and judge awarded $1.18 billion to a class of an
estimated 4.5 million State Farm customers in forty-eight states.
This award was based upon the companyís post-crash repair cost
estimates on the basis of cheap and allegedly inferior
aftermarket parts.48 Plaintiffs did not allege that State Farmís
policy, which many states encourage or even require to control
automobile insurance rates, caused them physical injury or
consequential pecuniary losses such as lost resale value.49
Instead, they prevailed on the claim that aftermarket parts are
inherently inferior and therefore fail to satisfy State Farmís
contractual obligations to restore vehicles to their pre-loss
condition.50
In Price v. Philip Morris Inc.,51 another Illinois state court
approved a $10.1 billion verdict in favor of a class of Illinois
purchasers and consumers of Marlboro Lights and Cambridge
Lights.52 The action did not include claims for personal injury. 53
Rather, plaintiffs claimed that the advertisements of the
297 F. Supp. 2d 171 (D.D.C. 2003).
Id. at 172, 175.
Id. at 172-73.
Id. at 172.
Id. at 175-76 (summarizing plaintiffsí complaint).
746 N.E.2d 1242 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
Id. at 1247. The court subsequently reduced the judgment by $130 million. Id. at
1261. The case is pending on appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. Avery v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 786 N.E.2d 180 (Ill. 2002).
49 746 N.E.2d at 1258.
50 Id. at 1259.
51 No. 00-L-112, 2003 WL 22597608 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Mar. 21, 2003).
52 Id. at *29.
53 Id. at *3.
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
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products as ìLightsî and ìLowered Tar and Nicotineî were
deceptive, unfair, and calculated to create the false consumer
impression that the products were safer or less harmful than
regular cigarettes.54 Plaintiffs claimed to have overpaid in
reliance on these misrepresentations.55
They sought and
obtained damages for the difference between the purchase price
and the value of the product that they actually received.56 The
trial judge credited a consumer survey conducted by a plaintiffís
expert, which estimated the diminution in value at 92.3 percent,
and on that basis arrived at ìcompensatoryî class damages of
$7.1 billion.57
Quite obviously, ordinary notions of detrimental reliance and
inducement play a distinctly subordinate role in those cases;
otherwise, it is hard to see how a court could possibly certify
inchoate classes of consumers who vary greatly in their degree of
reliance and injury (if any).58 From the ex ante perspective, these
differences are immaterial. The right rule will skim off the
entire surplus of the transaction (both the producer and
consumer surplus), which the inframarginal consumers, for
whom the products worked as advertised, have already received
and will get to keep in any event. The rule will provide full
insurance compensation for the consumer class and distribute
the remaining funds (if any) to someone else, for some other
ìpublic use.î59
Id. at *4.
Id. at *15.
Price, 2003 WL 22597606, at *15.
Id. at *16ñ17.
The nationwide class certified in Avery is highly problematic in many respects. It
could not possibly be sustained in the Seventh Circuit, which covers Illinois. See In re
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1018 (7th Cir. 2002) (ìBecause these claims
must be adjudicated under the law of so many jurisdictions, a single nationwide class is
not manageable.î), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1105 (2003). Due to the requirement of complete
diversity, however, the case could not be removed to federal court. State Farmís repeated
attempts to have the class decertified in state court and an interlocutory petition for
certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court remained unsuccessful. State Farm v. Speroni, 525
U.S. 922 (1998) (denying certiorari); Avery v. State Farm, 746 N.E. 2d 1242, 1257 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2001) (affirming class certification).
59 See Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation, supra note 41, at 1896.
The cheerful ìpublic useî appellation conceals grave problems at both ends of the
transaction. It suggests that the ìpublic useî is ipso facto superior to the producerís
ìprivateî useóincluding, presumably, the production of future goods or services. In this
regard, the purveyors of an ex ante regime leave themselves open to the charge of playing
in a static world. That problem is aggravated when the ìpublic useî of the ìexcessî is
handed over, as often it is, to a private organization with the stated objective of siphoning
off the next producerís surplus. See James R. McCall et al., Greater Representation for
California ConsumersóFluid Recovery, Consumer Trust Funds, and Representative
Actions, 46 HASTINGS L. J. 797, 848 (1995) (ìThe consumer trust fund created by the
courtís order in Avco funded . . . [cases involving issues of concern to] low and moderate
income consumers in California . . . .î). See also Price, 2003 WL 22597608, at *49ñ50
(awarding unclaimed funds to the Illinois Bar Foundation, eleven law schools, the
54
55
56
57
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Like traditional common law plaintiffs, the members of the
plaintiff classes just described at least purchased OxyContin,
insurance policies, and Marlboro Lights, and did complain about
the characteristics of those products and the sellersí
representations. But if we are worried chiefly about deterrence
levels, those limitations may be superfluous. Perhaps, anyoneó
bystander, malcontent, plaintiffsí lawyer, public prosecutoró
should be permitted to sue and recover, so long as we rely on
courts to generate optimal deterrence levels.
Modern ìentrepreneurialî class actions, which are instigated
and controlled entirely by plaintiffsí lawyers, conform to this
pattern.60 Statutory law has moved in the same direction. Most
prominently, Californiaís Unfair Competition Law (ìUCLî)61
prohibits ìany unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or
practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading
advertising.î62 ìUnlawfulî acts are those that are unlawful under
any statute; hence, the UCL sweeps across the entire California
Code, including the criminal code.63 Moreover, compliance with
the law is not necessarily a defense since business practices that
are not ìunlawfulî may still be ìunfair.î64
The extraordinary breadth of the UCL is matched by the
liberality of its enforcement provisions. The act may be enforced
by state and local prosecutors and by literally any private party
acting ìfor the interests of itself, its members or the general
public.î65 Anyone can sue anyone else; the only standing
American Cancer Society, and in-state domestic violence, drug, and legal aid programs).
60 As for ìplaintiffsí lawyer,î it has become generally recognized that consumer class
actions are their products, not the nominal clients. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 32, at
341 (ìClass actions almost invariably come into being through the actions of lawyersóin
effect, it is the agents who create the principalsóand will not emerge without some
protection of the entrepreneurial initiative of those lawyers.î). As for ìbystanders,î the
requirement that the nominal consumer plaintiffs must at least have purchased the
product in question has been rejected explicitly in some cases. For example, the class in
Shaw v. Toshiba America Information Systems, Inc., included potential purchasers, who
were found to have standing to obtain injunctive relief. 91 F. Supp. 2d 926, 938 (E.D. Tex.
1999) (ì[I]t is not necessary for someone to actually own a defective computer in order to
experience continuing, adverse effects from it.î). The Shaw court affirmed standing
ìregardless whether Plaintiffs currently own one of Defendantsí computers, are thinking
about buying one of Toshibaís computers, or are commuting to work over a bridge with
design specifications tainted by allegedly faulty [diskette controllers].î Id. at 941. From
an ex ante perspective, this seemingly bizarre position is in fact quite plausible. See
Francesco Parisi & Jonathan Klick, Functional Law and Economics: The Search for
Value-Neutral Principles of Lawmaking, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV (forthcoming Winter 2004),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=441941.
61 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE ß 17200 (Deering 1992 & Supp. 2003).
62 Id. (emphasis omitted).
63 See Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 950 P.2d 1086, 1091 (Cal.
1998).
64 See McCall et al., supra note 59, at 822ñ25 (discussing case law).
65 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE ß 17204 (Deering 1992 & Supp. 2003).
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requirement is ìthat the plaintiff can effectively represent the
[broader] groupís interests.î66
With respect to fraudulent
business practices, for example, it is not necessary to show
deception, reasonable reliance, or damages to anyone, let alone
the plaintiff.67 Private enforcement may proceed even where the
predicate statute manifestly contemplates no such thing.68 The
procedural formalisms and due process safeguards of class
actions, which from an ex ante perspective are deadweight at best
and an invitation to opportunism at worst,69 have in fact
disappeared under the UCL. Actions on behalf of the public,
sometimes called ìrepresentative actionsî or ìquasi-class
actions,î may proceed without conforming to federal or state class
action requirements.70 While private litigants may not sue for
damages,71 they may obtain injunctive relief, as well as
restitution and disgorgement under equitable principles.72 The
California courts have created multiple vehicles to facilitate
generous monetary relief.73 In short, ì[t]he only apparent
limitation upon the practical reach of the UCL is the imagination
of man (and woman).î74
The best-known UCL plaintiff is Marc Kasky, a selfproclaimed activist who sued Nike over the companyís allegedly
false statements concerning its corporate practices in ThirdWorld countries.75 Mr. Kasky himself did not rely on those
statementsóand certainly not to his detriment. There was no
evidence that he had ever purchased a Nike product; in any
event, the companyís communications concerned its employment
practices, not the attributes of its sneakers.76 Nonetheless, and
McCall et al., supra note 59, at 826.
Podolsky v. First Healthcare Corp., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89, 98 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
See, e.g., Stop Youth Addiction, 950 P.2d at 1093; Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v.
Fisher Dev., Inc., 257 Cal. Rptr. 151, 155 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
69 For example, intra-class conflicts and hence inadequate representation of some
subclass by a class attorney have greatly troubled the Supreme Court. See Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 856 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591, 627-28 (1997). The ex ante perspective, in contrast, pushes towards unified,
mandatory class actions, which require a de facto surrender of the due process-based
formalities of Rule 23(b). David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only
Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 834, 840 (2002). See also Rosenberg,
Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation, supra note 41, at 1912 (class-action opt-out on
grounds of plaintiff autonomy ìis a prescription for making everyone worse off.î).
70 See McCall et al., supra note 59, at 839.
71 Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 833 P.2d 545, 557 (Cal. 1992).
72 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE ß 17203 (Deering 1992 & Supp. 2003).
73 See generally McCall et al., supra note 59, at 826-49 (discussing forms of relief and
case law).
74 Gail E. Lees, The Defense of Private and Governmental Unfair Competition Law
Claims, 694 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE LITIGATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE
COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, UNFAIR COMPETITION CLAIMS 2003, at 261, 306 (2003).
75 Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 248 (Cal. 2002).
76 See id.
66
67
68
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despite Nikeís vociferous First Amendment objections, the
California Supreme Court permitted the case to go to trial.77
After an unsuccessful petition to the United States Supreme
Court,78 the case settled for a $1.5 million payment to a corporate
watchdog group and Nike promised to mend its ways, both
employment-wise and speech-wise.79
One can think of Kasky v. Nike as the ultimate consumer
class action ex ante. The case conforms to that model in all
essential respects except one: proponents of the ex ante model
insist on a preclusive, res judicata effect on all possible
claimants.80 (Quasi-class actions under the UCL generally lack
such effects.)81 Alternatively, one can think of Kasky v. Nike as a
kind of consumerist public law action for the production of a more
ìrepublicanî globalization discourse that ought to proceed
regardless of what millions of participants below the Sunsteinian
margin may actually want to hear or say.82 At this point of
perfect convergence, consumer law has reached its culmination.
IV. RISKS OF A DUAL REGIME
It would be silly to deny the deterrence and transaction cost
problems that afflict the common law model. It may even be true
that those problems are particularly pronounced in the context of
consumer transactions. All that granted, a wholesale divestiture
of legal claims from their common law owners begets other,
potentially more vexing difficulties. For example, an ex ante
regime requires ancillary estoppel and preclusion rules that
make good on the promise to get the deterrence level right. What
then are those rules? Proponents of an ex ante regime, as noted,
favor mandatory class actions and wholesale preclusion.83 That
position raises serious due process concerns84 and numerous
practical problemsóprominent among them, the specter that
corporate defendants will cut themselves cheap, collusive

C1.

77
78
79

Id. at 262-63.
Nike v. Kasky, 123 S.Ct. 2554 (2003).
Lisa Girion, Nike Settles Lawsuit Over Labor Claims, L.A. Times, Sep. 13, 2003, at

See Rosenberg, supra note 69, at 849 n.42.
See Fellmeth, supra note 24, at 1 & 11 n.4; Lees, supra note 74, at 449.
Professor Cass Sunstein has repeatedly urged the mobilization of ìpublic lawî for
a ìrepublican discourse.î See Cass R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE
SPEECH 39ñ43, 68ñ92 (1993). Mercifully, Sunstein shrinks from the practical implications
of his proposal. See Stephen F. Williams, Background Norms in the Regulatory State, 58
U. CHI. L. REV. 419, 427ñ29 (1991) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS
REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE (1990)). More practical-minded
individuals like Marc Kasky lack such inhibitions.
83 See Rosenberg, supra note 69, at 840-48.
84 See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846-48 (1999).
80
81
82
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settlements with a plaintiffsí lawyer of their choice.85 The
problem appears in even sharper relief outside the context of
Rule 23 and its formal protections for absent class members.86
As noted, under Californiaís UCL, verdicts obtained by private
litigants on behalf of the public have no preclusive effect (barring
a preclusive judgment in a parallel class action).87 If they did,
the statute would be facially unconstitutional since it would
create a roving commission to dispose of the rights of absent,
unnotified parties.88 But now, the due process problem appears
at the other endóthe lack of preclusion raises the very real
threat of multiple prosecutions and verdicts over the same
violations by the same parties.89 This dilemma, which even the
California courts have recognized,90 has no easy solution.91
Similarly, the estimation of damages, restitution, or benefitof-the-bargain losses over a disparate class of consumers (outside
the context of particularized injuries) poses considerable risks of
judicial error. Proponents of an ex ante model argue that liability
awards are always a matter of statistics.92 Sophisticated survey
and sampling techniques will reduce the room for error, and the
elimination of confusing questions of causation or reliance will
generate judicial economies of scale.93 But neither the empirical
evidence nor practical considerations provide much support for
such comforting assurances.

See Issacharoff, supra note 32, 381 n.152.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(4).
Fellmeth, supra note 24, at 1 & 11 n.4.
See Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 950 P.2d 1086, 1106 (Cal.
1998) (Baxter, J., concurring).
89 See In re N. Dist. of Cal. ìDalkon Shieldî IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp.
887, 899 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (ìA defendant has a due process right to be protected against
unlimited multiple punishment for the same act.î), vacated on other grounds, 693 F.2d
847 (9th Cir. 1982). See W. Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71, 75 (1961)
(recognizing that courtís failure to protect defendants from identical claims in other courts
constitutes denial of due process).
90 See, e.g., Bronco Wine Co. v. Frank A. Logoluso Farms, 262 Cal. Rptr. 899, 911
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (ìOne must question the utility of a procedure that results in a
judgment that is not binding on the nonparty and has serious and fundamental due
process deficiencies for parties and nonparties.î).
91 In dictum in Kraus v. Trinity Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 999 P.2d 718, 733 (Cal. 2000), the
California Supreme Court suggested that courts might tackle the possibility of future
suits by ìcondition[ing] payment of restitution . . . on execution of acknowledgement that
the payment is in full settlement of claims against the defendant, thereby avoiding any
potential for repetitive suits on behalf of the same persons or dual liability to them.î Such
an extra-statutory band-aid, however, would do nothing to preclude follow-on suits in
cases where the defendant prevailed in the first case. Moreover, it would do nothing to
prevent plaintiffsí lawyer (and defendant) from disposing of the claims of members of the
public, including actually injured parties, without any of the formal and due process
protection of a class action.
92 Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation, supra note 41, at 1893.
93 Id.
85
86
87
88
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In the Avery litigation, the plaintiffsí expert estimated
consequential losses (principally the cost of replacing the
installed aftermarket parts with the original manufacturersí
products) at anywhere between $658 million and $1.2 billion.94
On cross-examination, he conceded that his high-end estimate
might be off by about $1 billion.95 The benefit-of-the-bargain
award in Price was, as noted, based on surveys of consumer
averments of what they would have paid had they known the
true nature of the product.96 The award is the difference between
that hypothetical price and an allegedly promised ìsafeî
cigaretteóby plaintiffsí own admission, a non-existent product.97
We are nonetheless asked to believe that it is possible somehow
to estimate a demand curve that slopes from here to there.
The sorts of calculations that go into these awards treat the
car buff who owns a vintage Chevy on a par with the owner of a
run-of-the-mill vehicle with a previously dented fender.98 The
latter may well be better off, both because the ìinferiorî
replacement part is superior to the dented, pre-loss original and
because he benefits as a repeat customer from State Farmís
general aftermarket parts policy. Likewise, the class in Price
includes everyone from health-conscious nicotine addicts, who
believed (however fantastically) that they were consuming a
ìsafeî product, to the merely image-conscious who are under no
such illusion and smoke Lights because they are socially more
acceptable than in-your-face, filterless Camels. In calculating
the awards in Avery and Price, the courts made do with an
expertís wild guess about the marginóand then effectively
treated every claimant as a marginal purchaser.99 The ìmistakeî
is hardly accidental. First, the lack of direct evidence of the
location of the margin or the distribution of claimants along the
demand curve invites this kind of shortcut.100 Second, any
serious consideration of the distributionóeven if only for
purposes of assessing aggregate damagesówould tend to
94

2001).

Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 746 N.E.2d 1242, 1260 (Ill. App. Ct.

95 Id. The court nonetheless characterized the expertís testimony as more than
ìsheer speculation.î Id. at 1261.
96 Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 00-L-112, 2003 WL 22597608, at *14-16 (Ill. Cir.
Ct. Mar. 21, 2003).
97 Id. at *15.
98 The vintage Chevy owner has suffered a genuine loss because both he and his
potential customers can tell a replacement fender from the real thing.
99 See Avery, 746 N.E.2d at 1260; Price, 2003 WL 22597608, at *16.
100 Nor can one ascribe the ìmistakeî of treating customers (yet again and by means
of a liability verdict) to the benefits of a bargain that they have already received to the
parochial incentives of state trial judges. For a federal appellate decision and opinion
along these lines, by a judge who really should know better, see Desiano v. WarnerLambert Co., 326 F.3d 339 (2d Cir. 2003).
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illustrate that the customers have practically nothing in common
but the bare fact that they are customers. A court that has
slighted or sidestepped that reality at the class certification stage
is unlikely to emphasize it at a later stage.
Put those considerations aside and assume a world without
transaction costs and, importantly, without judicial mistakes.
Assume that common law or ex ante rules could both yield
efficient results: it still does not follow that the conjunction and
simultaneous operation of those two regimes also yields efficient
results. A system that bars recovery for non-injured consumers
must offer full recovery for the marginal consumers who did rely
to their detriment on the sellerís representations. Conversely, an
ex ante rule must bar additional claims for compensation as a
form of ex post opportunism. In real life, however, the regimes
work in tandem.
To revert to the case examples, the Williams class consists of
all OxyContin purchasers for whom the product worked as
intended but who claimed that the product, contrary to the
companyís representations, proved addictive for some other
consumers.101 Those others are specifically excluded from the
class and remain free to sue over their alleged injuries regardless
of the outcome of the Williams litigation.102 The Avery plaintiffs
sued on their contract and under a state consumer-fraud
statute.103 If inferior placement parts caused consequential
damages for some class members (for example, by contributing to
a second crash) those individuals remain free to bring suit
against the manufacturer, installer, and presumably State Farm.
The Price plaintiffs sued for misrepresentation, not bodily injury;
Marlboro Lights smokers in Illinois remain free to bring product
liability lawsuits.104 Under Californiaís Unfair Competition Law,
verdicts and settlements in cases brought on behalf of the public
do not preclude subsequent lawsuits against the same defendants
over the same conduct by parties who are actually injured by the
unlawful conduct (as well as those who are not).105
While one might say that ex ante and ex post lawsuits
deter different types of conduct (for example, the sale of a
substandard product and fraudulent representations about it),
one cannot easily separate the claims in this fashion. In these
cases, misrepresentations count for legal purposes only if they
induce social losses and only because they produce them. Why
101
102
103
104
105

Williams v. Purdue Pharma Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d 171, 172-73 (D.D.C. 2003).
Id. at 172.
Avery, 746 N.E.2d at 1247.
Price, 2003 WL 22597608, at *3.
Fellmeth, supra note 24, at 1 & 11 n.4.
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else deter them? Conversely, the defendantís misrepresentations
are typically a crucial element in common law cases, for example,
to defeat the ordinary defenses in contract and tort. The plain
fact is this: so long as the parties actually injured can sue, any
additional deterrence is over the top.106 In allowing both types of
suits (without one foreclosing the other), we do in fact have an ex
ante rule and a common law rule operating on top of each other,
over the same range of transactions.
This dual regime has very nearly become a general norm.
For example, voluminous federal and state regulations govern
what manufacturers and service providers may and may not say
about pharmaceutical drugs,107 tobacco products,108 warranties,109
equity offerings,110 credit cards,111 and mortgage loans,112 among
other products.
We also have general federal and state
prohibitions against ìunfairî business practices, which are
defined and enforced by the Federal Trade Commission and by
state consumer protection agencies.113 These rules embody
rough-and-ready judgments about the socially acceptable (if not
exactly optimal) level of activity. They prohibit conduct that
would otherwise have to be deterred by means of litigation. In
other words, they are ex ante rules in legislative or
administrative form. However, only rarely do these rules have
preclusive and preemptive effect. For example, Marlboro Lights
were sold in meticulous compliance with federal laws and
regulations, but that fact failed to impress jurors and judges in
Madison County, Illinois.114 Compliance defenses rarely succeed
in liability lawsuits over ìunsafeî pharmaceutical drugs or
automobiles.115 The risk is not simply confusion or incoherence:
it is massive over-deterrence.

106 In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1017 (7th Cir. 2002) (ìIf tort law
fully compensates those who are physically injured, then any recoveries by those whose
products function properly mean excess compensation.î) (internal footnote omitted).
107 21 C.F.R. ß 202.1 (2003).
108 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. ß 1331 (1993).
109 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. ß 2302 (1998).
110 Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. ß 1601 (1998).
111 Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. ß 1637 (1998).
112 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, 12 U.S.C. ß 2801 (1997).
113 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. ß 45 (1991 & Supp. 2003); California
Unfair Practices Act, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE ß 17200 (Deering 1992 & Supp. 2003).
114 Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 00-L-112, 2003 WL 22597608, at *19 (Ill. Cir. Ct.
Mar. 21, 2003) (rejecting defendantís claim under the Federal Cigarette Advertising and
Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. ß 1331).
115 See, e.g., Edwards v. Basel Pharm., 933 P.2d 298, 303 (Okla. 1997).
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COMMON LAW AND CONSUMER LAW: CANíT WE HAVE ONE
WITHOUT THE OTHER?

Confident assertions about the efficiency of the common law
often seem to founder on the manifest inefficiencies of what now
passes for common law: would Judge Posner and his followers
kindly explain the liability explosion?116 Without wishing to
enter that messy and complicated debate, the preceding casual
observation suggests that many of the actual or perceived
problems stem, not from common law adjudication per se, but
from its conjunction or interaction with legislative rules and
interventions.
It seems quite obviously the case that the common law may
sua sponte go off the rails. Multi-billion dollar verdicts in some
product design defect cases are an example.117 Common law
terms and doctrines, from ìnuisanceî to ìunconscionableî and, for
that matter, ìinjury,î are sufficiently nebulous to sustain varying
social and economic arrangements under a nominally unchanged
doctrine.118 That openness creates a potential for efficient
adaptation and for ideological flights of fancy.119
Still, slides into wholesale nominalism are probably bound to
be exceptions to the general practice. At the end of the day, the
common law embodies reciprocity relations that are real, not
some theoretical construct. Not everything can be a nuisance.
My averred right to an unobstructed view is a prohibition on my
neighborís right to expand his home, and that consideration will
be obvious to the judge because the defendant will press it with
some force. Characterize anything but the literal truth as a
ìmisrepresentationî and all advertising will cease; that intuition
explains the continued viability of the distinction between
actionable misrepresentation and permissible ìpuffery.î120
116 See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal
Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1067, 1094 (1989), reprinted in
ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW 173, 200 (Richard A. Posner & Francesco Parisi
eds., 2002) (ì[A] decade of effort by economists to develop theories of tort law succeeded on
its own scholarly terms, but economists all too often provided efficiency proofs for
institutions that most lawyers now view as inefficient.î).
117 See, e.g., Ann W. OíNeill, 1999: The Year in Review, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1999, at
B2 (discussing a jury award of 4.9 billion in damages against General Motors when a 1979
Chevy Malibu burst into flames after being rear-ended by a drunk driver: the figure was
later reduced by three billion dollars).
118 The textbook example is still Judge Skelly Wrightís wholesale transformation of
ìunconscionabilityî in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir.
1965).
119 See, e.g, George L. Priest, The New Scientism in Legal Scholarship: A Comment on
Clark and Posner, 90 YALE L.J. 1284 (1981).
120 See, e.g., Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. Gen. Motors Corp., 506 N.W.2d 556,
559, 561 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
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Recognize anything as an ìinjuryî and it will soon transpire that
nothing may be left to compensate actually injured victims.121
Characterize as ìunconscionableî any sales practice or contract
terms that might scandalize a middle-class consumer with secure
credit (such as a federal judge) and it turns out that sales to lowincome, riskier customers dry up altogether.122 At some level, a
common law judge must care about activity levels as well as
harms; about production values as well as consumption; about
over- as well as under-deterrence.
So how does one strike a rough balance between these risks?
The much-maligned common law requirements that circumscribe
classes of plaintiffs and causes of actions, a starting point for the
consumer law critique of the common law, can be understood as a
kind of functional corollary or corrective to the inescapable
vagueness of central substantive doctrines.
A negligent
misrepresentation lies somewhere on a spectrum between fraud
at one end and an innocent effort to package consumer
information at the other, which can be done only by omitting
some information that is known to the seller. In cases alleging
misrepresentation, there are substantial costs to erring on either
side.
The common law must find a rough balance. On the one
hand, the legal defenses that sound in tort (which are the third
and last line of defense against abuse and exploitation, well
behind the competitive discipline of the market and contractual
defenses) must be given their proper real-world context to avoid
the threat of under-deterrence. On the other hand, the threat of
over-deterrence created by inflated loss allegations must be
avoided by limiting the universe of cases to those where the
losses are concretely visible. In these cases, detrimental reliance
ensures that the plaintiff before the court is actually the
marginal consumer whose losses are far more ascertainable than
the infra-marginal classís estimates of losses to someone else.123
Reciprocity-based inhibitions tend to give way when the
legislature signals an intention to promote consumer interests
and consumption values.
Presumably (judges surmise), a
legislature that enacts a consumer protection statute wants to do
more than to codify pre-existing law. Thus, courts may loosen
injury requirements and adopt more relaxed notions of
inducement and reliance even where the text of the statute
121 See Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 435-36 (1997) (asbestos
litigation).
122 See Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. &
ECON. 293, 305 (1975).
123 I owe the point to Richard Epstein.
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leaves some doubt about the legislatureís intent to prompt that
judicial response. Courts, one might say, act on what they take
to be the legislatureís signals, rather than following its
affirmative commands.
This broad-brush description captures the state judiciariesí
response to the enactment of ìlittle FTC actsî and analogous
consumer protection statutes passed by many states in the late
1950s and 1960s. For the most part, those state enactments
sought to strengthen the hand of public regulators and
prosecutors (foremost, the consumer protection offices of state
attorneys general) in enforcing prohibitions against unfair
competition, false advertising, and the like.124 Like the FTC
itself, state agencies generally enjoy broad discretion in defining
ìunfairî or ìdeceptiveî practices.125 Typically, public agencies are
not required to prove all the common law elements of statutory
offenses, for example, detrimental reliance by individual
consumers.126 This arrangement makes a good deal of sense: let
individual consumers sue over direct harms, and let public
prosecutors, whose abuses can be checked by political and
budgetary means, direct their attention to ìfraud on the marketî
offenses that are likely to be under-deterred through private
litigation.
Over time though, many state courts came to read those
statutes as a warrant for more expansive private litigation.127
The train of thought is not hard to follow: the legislatorsí
enhanced authorization of public prosecutors looks to all eyes like
an endorsement of consumer interests outside the confines and
When private plaintiffs
strictures of the common law.128
subsequently sue on those more expansive theories, they are
124 See Sovern, Reconsidering, supra note 28, at 448 (ìThe state statutes, like the FTC
Act, typically grant enormous power to the public agencies which enforce them . . . .î).
125 Jean Braucher, Delayed Disclosure in Consumer E-Commerce as an Unfair and
Deceptive Practice, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1805, 1807 (2000).
126 Agencies, both federal and state, need not even allege or show that a
ìmisrepresentationî was false. See, e.g., FTC v. Sterling Drugs, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 674
(2d Cir. 1963) (ì[P]roof of intention to deceive is not requisite to a finding of violation of
the statute . . . .î); Bockenstette v. FTC, 134 F.2d 369, 371 (10th Cir. 1943) (ìIt is not
necessary . . . for the Commission to find that actual deception resulted.î); FTC v. Balme,
23 F.2d 615, 621 (2d Cir. 1928) (ìNor is it necessary . . . to find . . . that any competitor of
the respondent has been damaged.î). See also Sovern, Reconsidering, supra note 28, at
444-45, 450-51.
127 See Seth William Goren, A Pothole on the Road to Recovery: Reliance and Private
Class Actions Under Pennsylvaniaís Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection
Law, 107 DICK. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (2002) (collecting cases and commentary).
128 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Monumental Props., Inc., 329 A.2d 812, 822 (Pa. 1974)
(We cannot presume that the Legislature when attempting to control unfair and deceptive
practices . . . intended to be strictly bound by common-law formalisms. Rather the more
natural inference is that the Legislature intended the Consumer Protection Law to be
given a pragmatic reading . . . .î).
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hardly acting contrary to the statutory intent; they are merely
assisting resource-strapped public agencies.
In the 1970s (the heyday of the consumer law movement),
state legislatures made the next move and provided explicitly for
the private enforcement of consumer protection statutes.129 Most
states also provided added incentives for private litigation,
typically in the form of attorneysí fees and treble damages for
certain violations.130 While federal courts sought to limit the
reach of expansive state statutes (for example, through broad
preemption under the Federal Arbitration Act),131 judicial
responses among the states appear to have varied greatly. In
some states, courts limited what they viewed as the scope of
private consumer litigation, often by means of reading common
law requirements of inducement, reliance, and injury into the
statutes.132 However, in most other cases the state judiciary
accepted the legislatureís invitation to give free rein to private
enforcers.133
California provides a dramatic illustration of judicial
creativity in expanding the reach of the Unfair Competition Act.
In particular, the creation of universal standing in Barquis v.
Merchants Collection Association of Oakland, Inc.134 was quite
plainly neither intended nor anticipated by the legislature.135
These differences in institutional agenda-setting and legal
development would make an interesting study for political
scientists. Of greater practical import though, is the nearuniform tendency toward greatly expanded private consumer
litigation.
That tendency is readily explained. In the area of consumer
law, as in many other venues, legislatures and courts act as
competing suppliers of substantially identical goods. Naturally,
the demand for consumer law will gravitate towards the more
favorable forum. The default outcome is that an expansion of
See Sovern, Reconsidering, supra note 28, at 448.
Id. at 448-49.
See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995); Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984). See also Williams v. Purdue Pharma Co., 297 F.
Supp. 2d 171, 174, 177 (D.D.C. 2003) (dismissing consumer complaint for lack of injury
despite statutory language authorizing ìany personî to seek redress for illegal trade
practices); Bullet Golf, Inc. v. U.S. Golf Assín, No. CV-94-4182-ER, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6189, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 1995) (dismissing claim under California FAA without
credible allegation of actual deception and injury).
132 See, e.g., Heidt v. Potamkin Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 354 S.E.2d 440, 441 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1987) (requiring reliance); Goren, supra note 127, at 32 (discussing and criticizing
Pennsylvania Supreme Courtís decision to that effect); Sovern, supra note 28, at 457-60.
133 See Goren, supra note 127, at 13-14.
134 496 P.2d 817, 839 (Cal. 1972).
135 Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 950 P.2d 1086, 1107-09 (Cal.
1998) (Brown, J., dissenting) (discussing statutory text and history).
129
130
131
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consumer law occurs so long as both or either institution say
ìyes.î It can be avoided only if both say ìno,î or else the naysaying institution affirmatively refuses to cooperate and then
presumes and exercises the authority to rein in the wayward
rival.
Such a scenario is barely thinkable. Theoretically, state
courts could, within the limits of their state constitution, refuse
to apply statutes in derogation of common law requirements.
Theoretically, legislatures could repeal private enforcement
provisions or judicial decisions to that effect. Neither courts nor
legislatures, however, are any good at this sort of thing. Both
confront great institutional obstacles even in reversing their own
decisions, let alone the decisions of a coordinate branch of
government. Litigation under Californiaís Unfair Competition
Law has spawned sufficient abuse and distress to prompt
stopgap interventions by the office of the attorney general.136 It
has also prompted reform proposals by a reform commission that
included prominent members of the plaintiffsí bar137 and a legal
scholar with impeccable consumer advocacy credentials.138 Still,
the California Supreme Court has emphatically declined
The
opportunities to curtail the scope of the statute.139
Sacramento legislature, for its part, has proven a graveyard for
reform proposals.140
VI. CONCLUSION
As legal doctrines change, so do institutional and interest
group arrangements. The loosening of common law requirements
in the 1970s had the intended result of facilitating consumer

136 Attorney General Bill Lockyer filed suit against a Beverly Hills law firm under the
same Unfair Competition Law that the firm was accused of abusing. Press Release, Office
of the Attorney General, Attorney General Lockyer Files ì17200î Consumer Protection
Lawsuit Against Beverly Hills Law Firm (Feb. 26, 2003), available at
http://caag.state.ca.us/newsalerts/2003/03-021.htm.
137 Unfair Competition Litigation, 26 CAL. L. REVISION COMMISSION REPS. 191 (1996).
138 See Fellmeth, supra note 24, at 1.
Professor Fellmeth has a long and
distinguished record as a consumer law advocate.
139 See, e.g., Stop Youth Addiction, 950 P.2d at 1115 (Brown, J., dissenting) (observing
that ìthe Courts of Appeal have done an admirable job of reining in the UCLís potential
for adverse regulatory effectsî and charging the majority with ìchoos[ing] to speed us
along the path to perdition.î).
140 In point of fact, the California legislature has repeatedly expanded the reach of the
UCL, typically in response to limiting judicial rulings. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
ß 17203 (Deering 1992 & supp. 2004) (reversing Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp., 230
Cal. App. 3d 1125, 1156 (1991)); State v. Texaco, Inc., 762 P.2d 385, 399 (1988) (holding
that the statute only applies to wrongful business practices). In light of the legislatureís
resistance, business-backed reform advocates now propose reform by means of an
initiative and referendum. See STOP $hakedown Lawsuits, Californians to Stop
$hakedown Lawsuits, http://www.stopshakedownlawsuits.com/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2004).
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litigation by public interest organizations and legal aid groups.141
In retrospect, the dominance of that form of litigation has proven
temporary.
Consumer law has long since slipped its
constituency-oriented moorings. It now responds to the demands
of lone rangers and, far more importantly, the class action bar.
Strikingly, the role of consumer protection statutes has
attracted very little attention in the public, political, or academic
debate over ìtort reform.î Perhaps this is because billion dollar
verdicts in ìmisrepresentationî cases are of somewhat more
recent vintage than older, yet equally spectacular, product
liability cases. Perhaps the business community prefers a
unifying agenda, such as a campaign against punitive damages
(which every corporation opposes) to an agenda that would
require a partial surrender of tactical opportunities. Like many
unfair competition laws, Californiaís statute permits business
firms to sue their competitors, and the stateís leading tort reform
group has insisted that these opportunities must be preserved in
reforming the statute.142 Also, state legislators quite probably
have an incentive to pretend that the ìliability crisisî is
altogether the fault of an out-of-control judiciary. Scholars
continue to teach Torts and Contracts without much attention to
peripheral interferences from consumer protection statutes.143
The obvious problem is that the periphery has long begun to
overwhelm the common law center. I seriously doubt that one
could find many contemporary class action cases of any
consequence where a conventional fraud or breach of contract
claim is not accompanied by a statutory claim of unfairness,
deception, or misrepresentation.144 The less obvious and more
challenging problem is the conjunction and interaction of
disparate theories of enforcement and recovery. A theory of
misrepresentation without reliance, inducement, and injury may
make a certain amount of sense in the context of a public
enforcement monopoly. However, wrenched out of that context,
141 Stewart Macaulay, Bambi Meets Godzilla: Reflections on Contracts Scholarship
and Teaching vs. State Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection
Statutes, 26 HOUS. L. REV. 575, 583 (1989) (ìLegal services programs have brought many
of the reported cases.î).
142 See John H. Sullivan, Californiaís Notorious ì17200îóWritten by Lewis Carroll,
Adapted by Stephen King?, Remarks at the Meeting of the Center for Legal Policy at the
Manhattan Institute and the Federation of Defense and Corporate Counsel (Oct. 24,
2002), transcript available at http://www.cjac.org/bp17200/.
143 Macaulay, supra note 141, at 575-76.
144 In three case examples discussed above, plaintiff sued under state fraud and
unfair competition statutes. See supra, notes 42, 47 & 51 and accompanying text.
Additionally, the Toshiba case was brought under the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. ß 1030. Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 926
(E.D. Tex. 1999).
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it becomes profoundly problematic.
Benefit-of-the-bargain
redress makes eminent sense in a common law case over a
breach of contract, but out of that context, it may turn into a
menace. Yet, for perfectly understandable institutional reasons,
what we have is a dual, overlapping regime.
I do not profess to know whether it is possible to unscramble
this particular omelet. One can think of partial steps in that
directionófor example, a sharper distinction between public and
private enforcers, or an expansion of affirmative compliance
defenses. The former strategy would confine common law and ex
ante rules to their respective domains; the latter would force a
social choice between the two. It may be too late or too early in
the day to contemplate such steps. Too late because the
privatization of public law norms, unhinged from requirements of
injury, is a fait accompli sustained by a seamless coalition of
consumer advocates and plaintiffsí attorneys. Too early because
common law modes of thought continue to exert a powerful pull
on our collective imagination.
To their credit, the most articulate proponents of an ex ante
regime emphatically proffer their scheme as an alternative to
common law modes of thought, not as a supplement.145 They
have been at pains to insist that public regulatory schemes are
often superior to, and ought to preclude, private litigation.146
Their clarion call is efficiency, not some boundless ideological
conception of ìconsumer rights.î147 Precisely this convergence of
efficiency theorems and consumerist nostrums ought to give
pause, and, after a deep breath, call attention to the political
economy of the beast. One may dismiss notions of plaintiff
autonomy and the individualís right to a day in court as so much
sentimental nonsense and ex post opportunism.148 The fact is
that the sentimentalists and opportunists will continue to vote,
litigate, and agitate in defiance of elegant blackboard schemes.
The siren song of consumer law in its modern, disembodied state
is precisely that everyone should have a day in court, injured or
not. To show that this bastard regime cannot be efficient from
any perspective is the easy part. The hard part is to tie ourselves
145 FRIED & ROSENBERG, supra note 39, at 14 (ìCrucially, ex ante and ex post
preferences are mutually exclusive concerning the fundamental purpose of the legal
system in managing accident risk.î).
146 Id. at 66-67; Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation, supra note 41,
at 1918-19 (ì[T]he general, well-documented advantages of these ìalternativesî dictate
resorting to courts only to the extent of systematic failure of administrative regulation to
control risk appropriately and of government and commercial first-party insurers to cover
loss adequately.î).
147 FRIED & ROSENBERG, supra note 39, at 13.
148 Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation, supra note 41, at 1911-16.
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